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Abstract 
We briefly discuss principles of fairness and equity in order to incorporate them in a 
mathematical method for the allocation of benefits or costs (the output) in a distribution 
problem, on the basis of the effort, the strength or the needs (the input) of the respective 
parties. Usually, input and output are multi-dimensional, and proportionality seems to be 
the leading principle. Therefore we employ several algorithmic ideas of Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis in order to support the solution of distribution problems, in particular 
the ideas underlying the Multiplicative AHP which was designed to process ratio 
information. We extend the method in order to cover the principles of progressivity, 
priority, and parity as well. Two examples, (a) the establishment of the member state 
contributions to the European Union, and (b) the allocation of seats in the European 
Parliament to the member states, show that the proposed method produces contributions 
and allocations with a higher degree of fairness and equity than the solutions adopted so 
far. 
Key words 
Fairness, equity, proportionality, progressivity, priority, parity, distribution criteria, desired 
ratios, logarithmic regression, geometric means. 
1. Introduction 
"All men agree that what is just in distriblrtioll nurst be according to merit in some sense, 
but they do rlot specify the same sort of merit" (Aristotle's Ethic, in the translation by J. 
Wamngton, 1963). This statement briefly summarizes the two issues to be discussed in the 
present paper. First, the leading principle in fairness and equity is proportionality, which 
means that the benefits and the costs (the output) to be allocated to the parties in a 
distribution problem must be proportional to the effort, the strength, andlor the needs (the 
input) of the respective parties. Second, since input and output are usually measured under 
several criteria so that they are multi-dimensional, we have to weigh the distribution 
criteria in order to establish the aggregate quantities that must be proportional. 
In this paper we present a general method to support a fair allocation of benefits and costs. 
As we will see (section 2), there are several principles of fairness. Proportionality is the 
leading one, not only in recent times but also in the Antiquity, see Aristotle (op. cit.) and 
the biblical parables of St. Matthew 25, 14 - 30 and St. Luke 19, 11 - 27. Many decisions, 
however, are based on the principles of progressivity, parity, or priority. According to the 
principle of progressivity, the output is increasingly assigned to the weaker or the stronger 
parties. Parity is the egalitarian principle whereby the output is divided into equal shares. 
The principle of priority awards the output in its entirety to one of the parties only. The 
choice of a particular principle is controlled by the assignment of specific values to certain 
parameters in the method. Since there is no clear border line between the above principles 
we design the method in such a way that the transitions from one principle to another one 
are as smooth as possible. 
Since we are confronted with the subjective evaluation of multi-dimensional entities we 
turn to Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) for the calculation of fair allocations 
(section 3). By the principle of proportionality we are led to the algorithmic steps of the 
Multiplicative AHP because this method is particularly designed for the elicitation and the 
processing of ratio information. Thus, we use logarithmic regression in order to analyze 
desired-ratio matrices, and we apply geometric-mean calculations in order to work with a 
variety of distribution criteria. We will demonstrate that the method can easily be used 
under the other principles of fairness as well (section 4). All we have to do is to employ 
powers of the desired ratios. With exponents greater (smaller) than 1 we model the 
principle of progressivity (moderation), and in the limiting cases, when the exponents tend 
to infinity (zero), we proceed to the priority (parity) principle. 
To illustrate matters, we first analyze the contributions of the member states to the 
European Union under the distribution criteria of population and Gross Domestic Product 
(section 5). With equal criterion weights we can reasonably enhance the fairness of the 
actual contributions. When we also take into account the national areas we obtain a really 
new, politically unexplored, set of contributions. This example highlights the typical 
features of our method. Similarly, we observe that the actual allocation of seats in the 
European Parliament deviates significantly from the allocation which is proportional to the 
size of the population. It can reasonably be approximated, however, by an allocation 
which is moderately proportional to the size of the population (section 6). Imposing 
certain additional constraints we can also prevent the total domination of the weaker 
countries by the stronger ones. We conclude this paper with a brief summary of open 
research questions (section 7). 
2. Fairness and equity 
Proportionality of input and output is by far the most widely discussed principle of fairness 
and equity. There are obvious utilitarian reasons for this. People are unwilling to make 
relatively high inputs unless they can look forward to relatively high outputs. Moreover, a 
person who can more effectively use a given scarce resource as a means of production 
should have a greater claim to its use. It is not unusual, however, that people moderate or 
amplifL a proportional distribution. Young (1994) proposes four principles to determine a 
claimant's share: proportionality, progressivity, parity, and priority. The rationale for the 
progressivity principle, usually found in taxation schemes, is that those who are better off 
should pay at a higher rate because they can absorb the loss more easily. Under the 
egalitarian parity principle benefits and costs are allocated equally, even if the parties are 
unequal. The priority principle is an "all or nothing" principle which assigns absolute 
precedence to one party in the allocation of benefits and costs. It is usually applied to 
distribute indivisible goods. 
Fishburn and Sarin (1994) discuss the issues of fairness and equity in the broad perspective 
of social choice. Fairness is based upon the preferences of individuals and groups, and 
upon the ways in which they perceive themselves in relation to others. Distributions that 
are fairest are those in which there is little or no envy among parties. Equity is based upon 
external ethical criteria, not on the specific preferences of individuals or groups. It is 
usually interpreted as some sort of equality, meaning that people are morally equal and 
should be treated with equal concern and respect. A distinction can also be made between 
fairness of outcome and procedural fairness (Linnerooth-Bayer et. a]., 1994). In the first 
case the emphasis is on the results of the distribution process (do the parties agree with the 
proposed shares?), in the second case on the distribution process itself and on the role of 
the respective parties in it (did they receive a fair treatment, did they have a fair 
opportunity to explain their viewpoints?). 
To conclude this section, we note that the literature on fairness and equity and on 
distributive justice is not only extensive but also conhsing. Many highly similar concepts 
appear under different names. It is not always clear how they could be made operational 
(that is in fact the objective of the present paper). For more information we refer the 
reader to Deutsch (1975, 1985), Kasperson (1983), and Messick and Cook (1983). 
3. A mathematical me.thod for fair allocations 
We consider a distribution problem with nl criteria and n parties, first under the principle 
of proportionality. Let us take the sylnbol rvk to represent the desired ratio of the 
contributions c, and ck to be made by the respective parties under criterion i. Let us hrther 
introduce the symbol R, = {riJk) to stand for the matrix of the desired ratios under the i-th 
criterion. This matrix is positive and reciprocal, but not necessarily consistent, just like a 
pairwise-comparison matrix in the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) of Saaty (1980). It 
may happen that r,,k x r,kr ;t rol (for an example, see section 5). Let w, stand for the weight 
assigned to the i-th distribution criterion. Following the mode of operation in the 
Multiplicative AHP of the first author (1993), we take the ratio cJ/ck of any pair of 
contributions to approximate the desired ratios rl,k, ..., r,,,k simultaneously, in the sense that 
we solve the contributions from the logarithmic-regression problem of minimizing 
lnriik - lnc. J +Inck 
i = l  j < k  
Actually, we carry out the unconstrained minimization by solving the associated linear 
system of normal equations with the variables u, = In c,, j = 1,. . . , n. Obviously, the u, have 
an additive degree of freedom. The c, will accordingly have a multiplicative degree of 
freedom. A particular solution to the regression problem is given by 
which can be obtained if we calculate first the geometric row means of the matrices R, and 
thereafter the geometric means of the row means. These operations may be interchanged 
without altering the final results. If the desired-ratio matrices happen to be consistent, the 
ratio of any pair of contributions is uniquely given by 
Let us illustrate the above results via the allocation of fair contributions to the European 
Union, to be paid annually by the member states. If the respective contributions must be 
proportional to the size of the population and the Gross Domestic Product, we have two 
diverging requirements that can only approximately be satisfied. Suppose that equal 
weights are assigned to these distribution criteria. We take the ratio cJ/ck of any pair of 
contributions to approximate the desired ratios 
and 
GDP, 
- -  
r2Jk - GDP, 
simultaneously by the solution of the above logarithmic regression problem. On the basis 
of formula (3) the ratio c,Ick can now be written as 
c I POD GDP 
I 
- - 
' I  I 
\IF% X  -. Ck GDP, 
If we also want to the use the national area as a yardstick to set the contributions, we 
introduce the desired ratios 
Area, 
r3Jk = -' Area, 
By formula (3) the ratio of any pair of contributions is now given by 
- G D q  Area, X -  x -  
POP, GDP, Ck = d" Area, ' 
at least if equal weights are assigned to the distribution criteria. The choice of the criterion 
weights in general is still under investigation. It is unclear, for instance, how large the 
weights should be in order to represent various gradations of relative importance of the 
distribution criteria. A detailed discussion of fair contributions to the European Union may 
be found in section 4. 
A refinement of the model is to replace the r,k by powers (ri/k)qi. The positive exponent qi 
introduces a moderation (amplification) of the desired' ratios under the i-th distribution 
criterion if q, < 1 (qi > 1). For very small (very large) values of q, there is a transition fiom 
the principle of proportionality to the principle of parity (priority). An application of the 
idea is presented in section 5, where we concern ourselves with the fair allocation of seats 
in the European Parliament. 
4. Fair contributions to the European Union 
The most recent data concerning the European Union may be found in the Eurostat 
Yearbook (1995). They reflect the situation until 1993. Table 1 shows the size of the 
population and the GDP of the respective member countries in that year. The resources of 
the European Union (63.75 billion ECU) consisted of customs revenues (16.8%), levies 
on agricultural imports and sugar storage (2.9%), a VAT-based levy (52.2%), a GDP- 
based contribution (25.2%), and non-attributable income (2.6%). The total contribution of 
Table 1. Popzrlation and Gross Don~eslic Prodrrct of the 12 Member States of the 
European Urlion in 1993. Data from Ezrroslat Yearbook 1995, pages 72 and 196. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Total 
Table 2. Actual Corltribzrliorls of the Member Stales lo [he European Union. Data from 
Eurostat Yearbook 1995, page 402. 
GDP 1993 
1000 million ECU 
125 
85 
1105 
5 9 
277 
810 
3 7 
658 
8 
205 
4 1 
709 
41 19 
Population 1993 
in millions 
10.07 
5.18 
80.98 
10.35 
39.05 
57.53 
3.56 
56.96 
0.10 
15.24 
9.87 
58.10 
317.29 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Total 
Population 1993 
percentage of total 
2.90 
1.49 
23.32 
2.98 
11.24 
16.57 
1.03 
16.40 
0.12 
4.39 
2.81 
16.73 
100.00 
percentage of tolal 
3.75 
1.80 
29.07 
1.31 
8.29 
18.18 
0.85 
16.85 
0.21 
6.28 
1.63 
11.75 
100.00 
GDP 1993 
percentage of total 
3.03 
2.06 
26.83 
1.43 
6.72 
19.66 
0.90 
15.97 
0.19 
4.98 
0.99 
17.21 
100.00 
1000 million ECU 
2.39 
1.21 
19.03 
1 .O 1 
5.19 
11.56 
0.57 
10.08 
0.17 
1.02 
0.91 
7.61 
63.75 
percentage of GDP 
1.91 
1.42 
1.72 
1.72 
1.88 
1.43 
1.53 
1.53 
2.10 
1.96 
2.21 
1.07 
1.55 
ECU per capita 
237 
233 
235 
98 
133 
20 1 
159 
177 
420 
264 
92 
13 1 
184 
Table 3. Possible Coritriblrtioris to the Elrropeari Uriior~ accordirig to the Size of the 
Population. 
Table 4. Possible Coritriblrtiorls to the E~~ropeali Urliori accordirlg to the Gross Domestic 
Product. 
percentage of GDP 
1.47 
1.11 
1.34 
3.22 
2.58 
1.30 
1.78 
1.59 
1 .OO 
1.37 
4.4 1 
1.50 
1.55 
1000 million ECU 
1.84 
0.95 
14.87 
1.90 
7.16 
10.56 
0.66 
10.45 
0.08 
2.80 
1.81 
10.67 
63.75 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Total 
ECU per capita 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
184 
percentage of total 
2.90 
1.49 
23.32 
2.98 
11.24 
16.57 
1.03 
16.40 
0.12 
4.39 
2.84 
16.73 
100.00 
ECU per capita 
192 
253 
211 
88 
110 
218 
160 
179 
300 
208 
64 
189 
184 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Total 
1000 nlillion ECU 
1.93 
1.31 
17.10 
0.91 
4.28 
12.53 
0.57 
10.18 
0.12 
3.17 
0.63 
10.97 
63.75 
percentage of total 
3.03 
2.06 
26.83 
1.43 
6.72 
19.66 
0.90 
15.97 
0.19 
4.98 
0.99 
17.2 1 
100.00 
percentage of GDP 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
1.55 
Table 5. Possible Contributiora to the Ezlropeclrl U?lio?l accorditlg to the Geometric 
Mean of the Popirlatio~l a ~ d  the Gross Domeslic Prodzlct. 
ECU per capita 
190 
218 
198 
128 
143 
202 
174 
183 
250 
198 
109 
188 
184 
Table 6. Natior~al Area a)ld Popirlatiotl Density of the Member States of the European 
Union. Data from Ez~rostat Yearbook 1995, page 168. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Total 
1000 million ECU 
1.91 
1.13 
16.07 
1.32 
5.58 
1 1.60 
0.62 
10.40 
0.10 
3.01 
1.08 
10.91 
63.75 
percentage of total 
2.99 
1.77 
25.22 
2.08 
8.76 
18.21 
0.97 
16.32 
0.15 
4.72 
1.69 
17.11 
100.00 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Total 
percelllage of GDP 
1.53 
1.32 
1.45 
2.24 
2.01 
1.43 
1.68 
1.58 
1.25 
1.47 
2.63 
1.54 
1.55 
National Area 1993 
percentage of total 
1.3 
1.8 
15.1 
5.6 
21.3 
23.2 
3.0 
12.7 
0.13 
1.7 
3.9 
10.3 
100.0 
National Area 1993 
in 1000 sq km 
3 1 
43 
357 
132 
505 
549 
70 
30 1 
3 
4 1 
9 2 
244 
2368 
Population Density 
inhabitants per sq km 
330 
120 
227 
78 
77 
105 
5 1 
189 
152 
3 70 
107 
238 
147 
Table 7. Possible Corrtribrrtiorls to the Ezlropeari Uriion according to the Geometric 
Mean of the Poprllation, the Gross Donlestic Prodrlct, arid the National Area. 
ECU per capita 
149 
228 
174 
186 
200 
227 
264 
175 
250 
146 
150 
165 
184 
Table 8. Number of seats in the Eriropeali Parliame~it, proportional to the size of the 
population of the nlenlber states (colz~mri 2), moderately proportiorzal to the size of the 
population ( co l~m~~is  3 - 5) ,  as ~vell as the actrlal allocatioti of seats iri 1993 (column 6).  
Data front Eurostat Yearbook 1995. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Total 
1000 n~illioll ECU 
1.50 
1.18 
11.07 
1.92 
7.80 
13.06 
0.94 
9.94 
0.10 
2.22 
1.48 
9.56 
63.75 
percentage of total 
2.35 
1.85 
22.07 
3.01 
12.24 
20.48 
1.47 
15.59 
0.15 
3.49 
2.32 
15.00 
100.00 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Total 
percentage of GDP 
1.20 
1.39 
1.27 
3.25 
2.82 
1.61 
2.54 
1.5 1 
1.25 
1.08 
3.61 
1.35 
1.55 
popo 
19 
10 
9 1 
124 
20 
7 
9 1 
1 
2 8 
19 
65 
92 
567 
Pop 
16 
8 
94 
132 
17 
6 
93 
1 
2 5 
16 
64 
9 5 
567 
pop0 
22 
13 
88 
116 
22 
10 
88 
2 
3 0 
22 
65 
89 
567 
pop0 
2 5 
16 
85 
108 
26 
12 
84 
3 
3 3 
25 
65 
85 
567 
Actual 
25 
16 
87 
99 
25 
15 
87 
6 
3 1 
25 
64 
87 
567 
each of the member countries in 1993 is exhibited in Table 2, which also shows how the 
contributions are related to the national economies. The contributions expressed as a 
percentage of the GDP vary between 1.07 (United Kingdom) and 2.21 (Portugal), the 
contributions in ECU per capita between 92 (Portugal) and 420 (Luxemburg). Since the 
ratio of the smallest to the largest contribution per capita is roughly 1:5, fairness is far to 
seek. 
The Tables 3 and 4 show that contributions proportional to the size of the population or 
the GDP only (one single distribution criterion) are also unfair. When only the size of the 
population is used, there is indeed a uniform contribution of 184 ECU per capita, but the 
contributions expressed as a percentage of the GDP vary between 1.00 (Luxemburg) and 
4.41 (Portugal). Similarly, with the GDP as the unique yardstick, the contributions are 
uniformly set to 1.55% of the GDP, but the contributions in ECU per capita vary between 
64 (Portugal) and 300 (Luxemburg). So, the ratio of the smallest to the largest 
contribution per capita is roughly 1:5, although the GDP is generally considered to be a 
proper yardstick for a country's ability to pay (see also Beckermann (1980)). 
A considerable improvement is obtained when we allocate the contributions on the basis of 
the size of the population and the GDP simultaneously, with equal weights so that formula 
(4) applies. Table 5 shows that the contributions expressed as a percentage of the GDP 
now vary between 1.25 (Luxemburg) and 2.63 (Portugal), whereas the contributions in 
ECU per capita vary between 109 (Portugal) and 250 (Luxemburg). Under both 
distribution criteria the ratio of the smallest to the largest contribution is reduced to 1:2. 
The third distribution criterion that may come up in the discussions on fairness and equity 
is the national area. A large area has many possible advantages for a country: a large 
amount of arable land and fresh water to support agriculture, large mountainous regions to 
support tourism and water winning, large spaces to enhance the quality of life, andlor 
large mineral deposits or fossil-fuel supplies. The national areas and the population 
densities of the member states may be found in Table 6. Table 7 shows the possible 
contributions to the European Union when the size of the population, the GDP, and the 
national area are used with equal weights to distribute the total burden. Formula (5) is 
clearly applicable. The contributions now vary between 1.08% (The Netherlands) and 
3.61% (Portugal) of the GDP, and between 146 ECU (The Netherlands) and 264 ECU 
(Ireland) per capita. The ratio of the smallest to the largest percentage of the GDP is 
higher than 1:2 now, but this may have a good reason: the population densities in the 
European Union vary widely, between 51 inhabitants per km2 (Ireland) and 370 (The 
Netherlands). The third distribution criterion is clearly an incentive for the member states 
to exploit their natural resources more effectively. 
Note. In the present paper we ignored the attempts of various European countries to use 
the principle of "juste retour" in order to regain their contributions to the Union as much 
as possible. 
5. Fair seat allocations in the European Parliament 
With some moderations, the principle of proportionality can also be used to "explain7' the 
seat allocation in the European Parliament as a hnction of the size of the population of the 
member states. Table 8 shows the respective seat allocations (calculated with Webster's 
apportionment rule, see Young (1994)) when the ratio s,/s~ of any pair of national 
delegations is taken to be 
With q = 1, we have pure proportionality on the basis of the size of the population. 
Smaller values of q lead to more equality between the delegations. Remarkably enough, 
the seat allocation for q = 0.7 practically coincides with the actual seat allocation in the 
European Parliament. At the extreme ends of the spectre, however, we find some 
discrepancies. There are two countries with an over-representation, Ireland and 
Luxemburg, and one with an under-representation, Germany. An issue to be put on the 
political agenda? 
Let us now use the seat-allocation problem in order to illustrate the introduction of certain 
constraints in a distribution problem. Barzilai and Lootsma (1997), considering the power 
relations in groups, proposed to limit the ratio of any two contributions to the range 
between '116 and 16 in order to prevent the total domination of the stronger parties over 
the weaker ones. Table 8 shows in column 6 that these constraints are actually satisfied in 
the European Parliament despite the discrepancies between Luxemburg and Germany. 
There are at least two ways to approximate or to achieve this via our method as well. 
The first approach does not exactly attain the goal. We truncate the desired ratios. Setting 
we define the desired-ratio matrix R with elements r,k such that 
This matrix is inconsistent, but it can easily be analyzed via logarithmic regression (see 
section 3): the geometric row means provide the number of seats per member state, in 
general as non-integer numbers with a multiplicative degree of freedom. 
The second option is to minimize the logarithmic-regression hnction (1) under the 
constraints 
for any j and k. This is a coilvex quadratic-programming problem when we take the 
logarithms of the contributions to stand for the variables. Since there are only differences 
of logarithms in the problem formulation, any solution has an additive degree of freedom. 
Thus, the number of seats per member state is produced in the form of non-integer 
numbers with a multiplicative degree of freedom. One needs an apportionment rule to 
obtain a workable seat allocation. 
6. Epilogue 
We conclude this paper with a brief sketch of some open research questions and some 
possible applications of our proposal to model the principles of proportionality, 
progressivity, parity, and priority via desired-ratio matrices and logarithmic regression. 
Our method is clearly applicable only as soon as a major decision has been made: what are 
the relevant distribution criteria? This question is beyond the scope of the method. It is 
one of our objectives, however, to model the relative importance of the criteria (see 
Lootsma (1996)) and to study the parameters controlling the convergence towards the 
principle of parity (moderation) or priority (amplification). 
It sometimes happens that additional constraints are imposed on the possible allocations 
(Ramanathan and Lootsma (1996)). Each party should have a minimum contribution, for 
instance, and certain coalitions of parties should not be permitted to dominate the scene. 
This may lead to a problem formulation where we are confronted with constrained 
minimization of the logarithmic-regression function (1). In general, as soon as we have a 
problem which is formulated in terms of the contributions and also in terms of their 
logarithms, we may be running up against a non-convex problem with local, non-global 
solutions. 
Just like in MCDA, we plan to extend the method so that it can be used in group-decision 
making. The method should not only identify the opinions of the individual members of the 
group. It should also come up with a possible compromise solution which takes into 
account the relative power of the members. 
A possible application is the allocation of hazardous waste to certain regions with widely 
varying levels of urbanization, industrialization, affluence, natural beauty, unemployment, 
and rural development. The potential of the method is still to be explored here. It can also 
be applied on any world issue where consensus has to be obtained after negotiations by all 
countries involved in a distribution problem. This is a typical problem that is regularly 
encountered in the global negotiations on actions to deal with the environment and with 
climatic change. We could possibly identify the important criteria and the preferences of 
the individual countries, and we could analyze the power structure of the negotiating 
parties, in order to arrive at a fair compromise solution. 
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